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Good governance, political experiences, and public support for mandatory 
sentencing: Evidence from a progressive US state  
Abstract 
A shift in public mood and declining incarceration rates in the US signal a 
potential change in the politics of punishment.  This research considers whether 
the public continues to support mandatory sentencing.  The study expands upon 
existing knowledge by testing theoretical predictions about how instrumentalism, 
political beliefs and political participation affect public support for mandatory 
sentences.  Drawing on a state-wide survey of 1,569 adults from Oregon the 
study found that belief in the effectiveness of prosecutors, judges, and prisons 
significantly influenced support for mandatory sentencing. Although 67% of 
those surveyed favored judicial discretion, a firm belief that “prisons work” may 
limit efforts to reduce incarceration and roll back mandatory sentences. 
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Good governance, political experiences, and public support for mandatory 
sentencing: Evidence from a progressive US state 
Beginning in 2010, the United States prison population declined for the first 
time in more than 30 years.  Five years later, it stood at 2005 levels (Carson and 
Anderson, 2016).  The public mood in the US has also moderated.  Citizens are willing 
to downsize prisons (Sundt, Cullen, Jonson, and Thielo, 2015) as long as it does not 
come at the cost of public safety (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012), and even traditionally 
“tough” US states like Texas are pursuing reforms with broad citizen support for 
treatment and prevention (Thielo, Cullen, Cohen, and Chouhy, 2016).  Optimists and 
reform advocates point to these developments as signs of a social movement toward 
greater tolerance. 
 There are also signs, however, that declines in the US incarceration rate and the 
political will for reform are tenuous.  Most of the decline in the US prison population 
may be attributed to California and the federal prison system, while many states 
continue to increase their rates of incarceration (Carson and Anderson, 2016).  In 
California, reforms were driven by a unique confluence of political, legal, and economic 
conditions (Schlanger, 2013).  Declines in the federal prison population occurred under 
the Obama Administration, which made criminal justice reform a priority.  Now, the 
Trump Administration has signalled a return to “law and order” and a rise in the 
homicide rate in several cities are again raising alarms about the threat of violent crime 
(Epstein, 2017). To borrow a phrase, it appears that reports of the death of punitive 
policy in the US are exaggerated.  
 Nevertheless, it is clear that the politics of punishment are changing.  If the 
prison build-up was the result of public demand for more punishment (Enns, 2014), will 
changes in public mood ultimately result in broader, sustained reductions in 
incarceration and a rollback of “tough” sentencing laws?  This question draws our 
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attention to the way punishment is tied to political life.  Cutting through the complexity 
about the causes of mass incarceration in the US, Travis, Western, and Redburn (2014) 
explain that growth in imprisonment resulted from a choice to pass laws increasing 
sentence lengths for a broader range of crimes.   
By locating the source of mass incarceration within political processes that 
affect sentencing and local decision making, scholars focus our attention more explicitly 
on the relationship between governance and punishment.  For example, Simon (2007) 
emphasizes how crime became a tool for governing, and crime control emerged as a 
tangible political good provided to fearful constituents who lost confidence in the ability 
of traditional institutions and professionals to address public safety.  Barker (2009) also 
locates the growth in incarceration in political life and argues that the ways individuals 
participate in democratic processes affects how states use punishment and maintain 
legitimacy with their citizens.  Pfaff (2017) shows how local political incentives and 
disincentives encourage prosecutors and other local criminal justice officials to 
overreact to increases in crime but little reason to change policy when crime falls.  
The current study considers whether the public continues to support mandatory 
sentencing in the context of these broader social and political changes.  The study 
expands upon existing research by testing theoretical predictions about how 
instrumentalism, political beliefs and political participation affect public support for 
tough penalties.  We consider these issues by surveying residents of Oregon.  Although 
Oregon is a progressive state politically it also has a strong affinity for mandatory 
sentencing and the Oregon prison population continues to grow.  These conditions 
provide an intriguing context to examine questions about political beliefs and 
sentencing policies. 
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Public attitudes and the politics of punitiveness 
Public opinion is central to debates about the role that politics play in shaping 
United States punishment policies.  While we know that citizens’ attitudes are 
important, the relationship between public opinion and public policy is complicated 
(Frost, 2010; Unnever and Cullen, 2010).  It is unclear, for example, whether public 
opinion drives sentencing policy or whether politicians motivate support for policies 
with punitive rhetoric (Beckett and Sasson, 2000; Roberts and Hough, 2005; Tonry, 
2004).  Gaubatz (1995) observes, “the movement in public opinion largely preceded the 
changes in policy” during the get-tough era (p. 9).  Nicholson-Crotty and colleagues’ 
(2009) findings are consistent with Gaubatz.  “[A] more punitive public opinion results 
directly in more punishment.  In [the] case [of Federal policy], we know that demands 
for action from the government result in specific action” (p. 652).   More recently, Frost 
(2010) argues the relationship is reciprocal, “with public opinion playing an important 
role in the development of public policy and political posturing affecting public 
opinion” (p. 157).    
The association between public opinion and punitive policies may also be 
examined through the lens of incarceration rates in the United States.  For example, 
Enns (2014) finds that punitiveness is a “fundamental determinant of the incarceration 
rate.  In fact, if instead of becoming more punitive, the public’s support for being tough 
on crime had remained constant since the mid-1970s… there would be about 20% fewer 
people incarcerated today” (p. 869).  Enns’ analytical strategy is noteworthy because 
incarceration rates shed light on the effects of punitive policies, rather than the mere 
existence of policies.  Furthermore, the findings provide a sense of how criminal justice 
officials respond to public opinion in administering policy.  
Several frameworks attempt to explain why the public supports getting tough on 
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crime.  Of particular interest here are two ideas.  First, individuals may endorse punitive 
responses to crime because they believe that it is good policy—it protects the public, is 
efficient, and serves justice.  This view is consistent with a rational-goal model of 
criminal justice (Feeley, 1973).   According to this perspective, punitive policies “work” 
and criminal justice professionals are considered competent professionals who can 
effectively respond to crime.  Second, punitive policies may be influenced by political 
experiences, structures, and beliefs.  This view posits that punitiveness results from a 
lack of trust in government institutions and a sense that criminal justice professionals 
are not responsive to public safety needs. The escalating crime and distrust model is 
similar to the idea of a moral panic in regards to the issue of crime, which explains the 
existence of a punitive trend even in the absence of a rise in crime rates.  In both of 
these views, perceived (if not actual) increases in crime and fear of crime are thought to 
increase punitiveness.  The two perspectives differ, however, in predictions about how 
trust in government and confidence in criminal justice professionals will affect 
punitiveness. 
 Public support for mandatory sentencing is an especially good exemplar of these 
theoretical models due to the strong association between mandatory punishments and  
“tough” crime control and the way that mandatory sentences substitute legislative and 
prosecutorial authority for judicial authority.  Simon (2007) observes that prosecutors 
have replaced judges as the most trusted agent of the courts.  As the power of the 
prosecutor rose, he argues, judges began to be perceived as betrayers of the common 
good, namely too soft on crime.  Within mandatory sentences we see strains of 
instrumental crime control and shifting ideas about how government should exercise 
coercive authority.  By mandating punishment, mandatory sentences may also reflect a 
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lack of trust in criminal justice professionals to exercise discretion in the public interest 
(Zimring and Johnson, 2006). 
Mandatory sentences have garnered mixed support in public opinion polls.  In a 
review of the research, Roberts (2003) concludes that the public is “deeply divided” 
regarding mandatory sentencing policies (p. 483).  A comparison of opinions in the 
mid-1990s to the early 2000s also demonstrates the fluidity of public opinion on 
mandatory sentencing. Between1995 and 2002, the number of respondents who said 
mandatory sentences “are a good idea” dropped from 55% to 45% (Peter D. Hart 
Research Associates, Inc., 2002).  A1999 poll linking policy preference to voting 
intention revealed that more than half of the sample “would be more likely to vote for a 
politician who advocated increasing judicial discretion—the antithesis to mandatory 
sentencing” (Roberts et al., 2007, p. 77).   Finally, a 2014 poll found that 77% of 
Americans favored eliminating mandatory minimum prison sentences for nonviolent 
offenders (Ekins, 2014).  Together these results suggest that public support for 
mandatory sentences is “mushy” and dynamic—perhaps sensitive to offender type, 
question wording, and social context. 
Punitiveness as Effective Crime Control 
If longer sentences reflect the “will of the people” and government policy is responsive 
to citizen demands, what motivates the public’s desire for more punishment?  The 
answer to this question may be simplified into two categories—instrumental and 
expressive motives.  Thus, punitiveness may be viewed as utilitarian, leading to a 
particular public good, or as affective, reflecting various emotions and expressive 
desires.  Although scholars hypothesize that the increased punitiveness of the last 
several decades reflects broad cultural and social shifts more consistent with affective 
 8 
motives (Garland, 2001; Simon, 2007; Tonry, 2004), there is also evidence of 
utilitarianism among members of the public. 
For example, Nicholson-Crotty et al. (2009) found that the crime rate mediated 
the relationship between policies and public support for punishment suggesting that the 
public responds to objective changes in public safety with a desire for more punitive 
policy.  Public opinion about sex crimes also appears to be influenced by utilitarian 
concerns. Pickett et al. (2013) found that beliefs that sex crime is on the rise and that 
sex offenders are unreformable predicted support for tougher sex crime laws.  Useem, 
Liedka and Piehl (2003) found little support for the assertion that punitiveness is caused 
by social disruptions like job loss and life dissatisfaction.  They conclude the prison 
buildup was primarily due to public concern about crime and belief that incarceration 
could address that concern.   
Other observers argue that the distinction between instrumental and expressive 
motivations for punishment is blurred.  Hudson (2001) reminds us, for example, that 
rational policies and harsh policies have simultaneously been enacted, and the balance 
between managerial rationality and populist punitiveness can shift.  Rational policies, 
Hudson argues, indicate an acceptance of high crime rates as normal but manageable 
with a focus on public protection rather than just deserts.  More recently, Carvalho and 
Chamberlen (2017) argue that punishment pleases because it appeals to a desire for 
utility.  “[P]eople may…want to believe punishment has utility because of the way it 
makes them feel” (p. 4). 
Belief in the utilitarian appeal of prisons may be especially relevant to 
understanding why incarceration rates have increased over the last several decades. A 
comprehensive review of research conducted in 1980s and 1990s found that the public 
had a strong preference for punishing a wide range of crimes with imprisonment 
 9 
(Cullen et al. 2000).  Although the public appears skeptical about the ability of prisons 
to change individuals, they nevertheless see value in the ability of prisons to 
incapacitate offenders, particularly those who are dangerous and violent.  Even in the 
context of waning public support for harsh punishments and a willingness to consider 
alternatives to long prison sentences, 84% of the public favored sending fewer low-risk, 
nonviolent offenders to prison in order to keep violent criminals in prison for their full 
sentences (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012).   
Punitiveness and Political Experiences 
A number of political experiences and attitudes have gained theoretical interest 
as attention has shifted to understanding the prison build-up as a policy choice.  Three 
concepts are of particular interest: trust in government, political participation and 
responsiveness, and political ideology.  Trust in government can influence the public’s 
willingness to support government policies and a “trust deficit” in Western countries 
may lead to policies that align with common sense, rather than evidence (Baker and 
Roberts, 2013, p. 126).  A lack of trust may also explain why highly punitive policies 
have been widely implemented and accepted by the public (Baker and Roberts, 2013; 
Hudson, 2001).  For example, Zimring et al. (2001) found that Californians who were 
the most distrustful of government were the most likely to support a “three strikes” law.  
The level of confidence in the courts is consistently lower than the levels of confidence 
in the entire criminal justice system, the police, or prisons (Freiberg and Gelb, 2008), 
and an “acute crisis of confidence in elite expertise” is said to be evident in the US 
(Green, 2009, p. 528).  Confidence in court actors may also help to explain beliefs about 
judicial discretion. “The statistics show that the overwhelming proportion of Americans 
express the view that sentences are too lenient (Roberts et al., 2003, p. 27).  
Simon (2007) frames governing through crime as establishing social control in 
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the absence of trust.  He views punitive policy preferences as a combination of beliefs 
that crime is escalating and professionals cannot handle this rise effectively.  Barker 
(2007) proposes a more nuanced view, theorizing that social trust is one factor 
impacting whether pragmatic or punitive views dominate.  Overall, she posits that a 
context with a high degree of democratization and intense social polarization is more 
likely to result in crime victim demands for vengeance, while a context with intensive 
civic engagement and well-developed social trust and norms of reciprocity are more 
likely to result in pragmatic policies (Barker, 2007). 
The degree to which government is responsive to citizens’ preferences may also 
influence the relationship between policy, civic participation, and trust (Teorell, 2006).  
For example, if citizens do not believe that criminal justice officials are responsive to 
their concerns about crime this may increase support for mandatory sanctions, which 
appear to require certain action.  Similarly, participation may be related to beliefs about 
political trust and responsiveness.  Belief that government is trustworthy and responsive 
may also affect a willingness to participate in civic action or participation may increase 
trust when citizens believe that their engagement has influenced policy (Teorell, 2006). 
Finally, political ideology appears to be a central factor in explaining public 
opinion about punishment (Frost, 2010).  Specifically, liberals report less support for 
mandatory minimums (Flanagan, Brennan, and Cohen, 1991), which may be explained 
in part by the finding that Democrats are more supportive of judicial discretion (Gerber 
and Engelhardt-Greer, 1996).  Similarly, liberals are said to be less punitive generally, 
while Americans who identify as conservative are more punitive (Frost, 2010).  
Simon links ideas about governance to citizens’ fear of crime.  By framing all 
citizens as actual and potential victims, lawmakers create a “constantly renewed 
rationale for legislative action” (2007, p. 77).  Combined with a lack of institutional 
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trust in the courts, this narrative fuels a culture of fear and creates a perpetual cycle of 
punitive policies.  Barker (2009) views penal sanctions as the product of collective 
action.  How people react to fear and the threat of crime is moderated by government 
structures that encourage or discourage civic engagement, trust, and reciprocity. 
Research Strategy 
We test the effect of three models predicted to influence support for mandatory 
sentencing among residents of Oregon.  Oregon voters have passed several mandatory 
sentencing laws covering a wide range of behaviour by direct voter initiative.  The most 
infamous of these initiatives, Measure 11, was enacted in 1994 with close to 67% of 
voters supporting the ballot initiative.  The law required that individuals convicted of 1 
of 19 crimes serve a mandatory minimum prison sentence that ranged from 70 to 300 
months. The law also prohibited “earned time” and mandated automatic transfer of 
juveniles charged with a “Measure 11” crime to adult court (Merritt, Fain, and Turner, 
2006).  Attempts to repeal Measure 11 by legislative action or ballot initiative have 
failed (Merritt et al., 2006).  In addition to Measure 11, two other major mandatory 
sentencing laws were passed by direct voter initiative in 2008 and 2010, the first 
increasing minimum sentences for repeat property and drug offenders and the second 
for repeat sex offenses and drunk driving. 
Although Oregon ranks near the median nationally in punitiveness and 
imprisonment rates, the punishment rate—the ratio of inmates to crime—increased by 
214% between 1983 and 2013 (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016).  In addition, Oregon’s 
prison population and rate of incarceration continue to grow (Carson and Anderson, 
2016).  Measure 11 is a one of the primary drivers of the increase in Oregon’s 
incarceration rate.  Measure 11 increased the rate of incarceration in the state and the 
length of sentences across a range of offenses including those not covered by the law 
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(Merritt, et al. 2006).  Examining the source of support for mandatory sentencing 
among Oregon residents is an opportunity to understand why some US states continue 
to pursue policies that increase reliance on incarceration. 
Methods 
Sample and Data Collection 
In the summer of 2010, survey data were gathered from a random sample of 1,569 
Oregon adults with a 15-minute telephone survey administered by the Portland State 
University Survey Research Laboratory.  Surveys were conducted in English and 
Spanish.  The sample was stratified by region to more accurately represent the 
geographical and population areas of the state.  In addition, African American and 
Hispanic residents were oversampled to obtain more reliable results from members of 
these racial and ethnic groups.  
Based on formula 3 of American Association of Public Opinion Research (2008) 
standards, the response rate for the general sample was 12%, which is consistent with 
response rates obtained in recent national telephone polls (Keeter, Hatley, Kennedy, and 
Lau, 2017).   Although response rates have declined in recent years, this has not 
necessarily affected the representativeness of phone surveys.   This is because response 
rates are not a good indicator of non-response bias, which tends to be question specific 
(Peytchev, 2013).  Sampling error and comparison of sample characteristics with 
population parameters provide a better indicator of representativeness than response 
rates alone.  In the current study, the error attributed to sampling at the 95% level of 
confidence was plus or minus 2.47 percentage points.  Women were overrepresented in 
the study due to their higher participation rates.  The descriptive results reported below 
are therefore weighted to accurately reflect the proportion of women and racial 
minorities in the population of Oregon. 
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Measures 
Support for mandatory sentencing   
Global support for mandatory sentencing was measured with an item used in previous 
public opinion polls (e.g., Princeton Research Associates, 2006). Respondents were 
instructed:  “Oregon currently requires a prison sentence of a specific length of time for 
all who are convicted of certain crimes.” Next, participants were asked, “In general, do 
you think mandatory sentences are a good idea, or do you think that judges should have 
more say in deciding sentences?”  This dichotomous item provides a measure of 
respondents’ general attitudes toward mandatory sentences and judicial discretion (1 = 
mandatory sentences are a good idea; 0 = judges should have more say).   Care was 
taken to avoid evoking opinions about existing or pending1 mandatory sentences laws or 
about specific types of offenders to obtain an indicator of global attitudes.  Less than 
2% of respondents volunteered that they “did not know.” 
Perceived efficacy of criminal justice institutions 
Prior research suggests that confidence in judges and prosecutors may be important 
determinants of support for mandatory sentences.  Confidence in the efficacy of judges 
and prosecutors was measured by asking participants to share their “opinion on how 
well different groups in Oregon are doing addressing crime and public safety.”  Groups 
included “judges” and “prosecutors and district attorneys,” as well as other criminal 
justice actors such as law enforcement and correctional officers.  Representatives of the 
criminal justice system were presented in random order on the survey and respondents 
were asked to indicate whether each group was doing a “poor job,” “fair job,” “good 
job,” or “excellent job.”  Twelve percent of respondents volunteered that they did not 
know how well prosecutors performed their jobs and 10% said they did not have an 
opinion about the efficacy of judges.  Non-response was unrelated to attitudes about 
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mandatory sentencing.  These participants were excluded from further analysis. The 
items were treated as continuous variables with higher scores indicating a higher level 
of confidence in the work of prosecutors and judges.   
As discussed above, preference for mandatory sentencing may also be based on 
certain beliefs about prisons.  Two ideas are explored here—belief that the purpose of 
prison is to protect the public and belief that the purpose of prison is to punish 
offenders.  Thus we distinguish between the perceived efficacy of prisons as a tool for 
promoting public safety and support for incarceration based on more expressive, 
punitive desires.  These concepts were measured by asking respondents to report what 
they believe should be the “main emphasis in most prisons.”  Response options included 
“punishing the individual convicted of a crime,” “trying to rehabilitate the individual so 
that they might return to the community as a productive citizen,” and “protecting 
society from future crimes they might commit.”  Dichotomous variables were created 
with support for rehabilitation as the excluded group.   
Political beliefs and experiences 
As discussed above, a preference for mandatory sentencing is expected to be higher 
when citizens do not believe that government is trustworthy or responsive to their 
interests and when they do not participate in political processes.  The American 
National Elections Studies’ (nd) political trust index was used here as a global indicator 
of political trust in government.  The political trust index is the most widely accepted 
measure of satisfaction with political life and assesses whether government is 
performing as respondents expect (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990).  Respondents were 
asked to report their level of disagreement or agreement with statements such as “I trust 
the government in Washington, DC to do what is right” and “The government is run by 
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well meaning people.”  The latent concept “political trust” was measured by summing 
the factor weighted standardized variables (alpha reliability = .78).    
  In addition, a modified version of the ANES external political efficacy index 
was used to measure belief in the responsiveness of government to citizen demands 
(Craig et al., 1990).  The external political efficacy index consisted of three items 
including “Public officials don't care much about what people like me think” and “I feel 
like my vote matters” (alpha = .71).   
Political participation was measured by asking respondents whether they voted 
in the last presidential election (1 = yes; 0 = no), which was the most recent election at 
the time the survey was administered.  As a point of reference participants were 
reminded, “This was the 2008 election between Barack Obama and John McCain.” 
Political ideology was measured by asking individuals to self-identify as liberal 
or conservative on a 7-point scale, with 1 representing “extremely liberal” and 7 
representing “extremely conservative.” 
Victimization, perceived risk, and fear of crime   
Advocates of mandatory sentences often invoke the needs of crime victims as a basis 
for limiting judicial discretion.  Scholars also hypothesize that the fear of crime and 
perceived risk of victimization are sources of support for punitive policies.  
Victimization was measured by asking respondents whether they had experienced any 
of 9 specific property and personal crimes in the previous year.  We explored various 
coding strategies including total victimization experiences, personal victimization, 
property victimization, or any victimization within the previous year.  There were no 
significant differences in the correlations between the various measures and the 
dependent variable.  Thus, we retained the most parsimonious and inclusive measure, 
victimization within the last year (1= yes; 0 = no).  To measure perceived risk of crime, 
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participants were asked if they believed that crime in the state of Oregon had 
“increased,” “decreased,” or “stayed about the same” in the past year.  Finally, 
respondents were asked to report how often they felt safe in “their community” to 
measure fear of crime.  Possible responses included “always feel safe,” “almost always 
feel safe,” “sometimes feel safe,” “almost never feel safe,” and “never feel safe.” 
Control variables 
Age, income, gender (1 = female; 0 = male), and race (1 = African American; 0 = other 
race) were included as control variables. 
Results 
Attitudes about Sentencing, Judges, and Prosecutors 
Although Oregon citizens have a history of supporting mandatory sentences at the ballot 
box, 64% of survey respondents thought “judges should have more say” in determining 
criminal sentences, whereas 37% said “mandatory sentences are a good idea.” This 
result can be compared to polls of US adults conducted in 1995, 2001, and 2006. The 
percentage of residents endorsing mandatory sentences as a “good idea” has markedly 
declined over this time period.  In 1995, 55% of the public said mandatory sentences 
were a “good idea” (Flanagan and Longmire, 1995).  By 2001, however, only 38% of 
US residents thought the policy was a “good idea” (Peter Hart and Associates, 2002). 
Finally, a 2006 poll found that 36% of the public thought mandatory sentences were a 
“good idea” (Princeton Survey Research Associates, 2006).  The 2006 result is within 
the margin of error found in the current study, suggesting that general support for 
mandatory sentences may have plateaued around 36%. 
Oregonians reported moderate levels of confidence in the work of judges and 
prosecutors (See Table 1).  Although few participants said that judges or prosecutors 
were doing an “excellent” job (4.7% or less), a plurality thought that judges (46%) and 
prosecutors (46%) were doing a “good job” of addressing crime and public safety.  
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However, a level of skepticism about judges and prosecutors was reported by 
approximately half of the sample, which viewed the work of judges and prosecutors as 
“fair” (37% to 39%) or “poor” (12.5% to 11%).  
[Table 1 About Here] 
Sources of Support for Mandatory Sentencing 
The sources of support for mandatory sentences were estimated in three logistic 
regression models.  The first model examined the set of variables that can be 
summarized as perceptions about the efficacy and utility of specific criminal justice 
actors and prisons.  The second model examined the effect of general political beliefs 
and political participation. Finally, a full model including all of the variables of interest 
was estimated.  The results of the analyses are reported in Table 2.   
[Table 2 About Here] 
Beliefs about the efficacy of criminal justice institutions exert an important 
influence on support for mandatory sentences in the first model tested.  Specifically, 
confidence in prosecutors (B = .32, p ≤ .05) significantly increased the odds of 
favouring mandatory sentences.  Controlling for other variables in the model, a unit 
increase in prosecutor efficacy was associated with a 37% increase in the odds of 
supporting mandatory sentences.  Conversely, a unit increase in perceived judicial 
efficacy was associated with a 22% decrease in support for mandatory sentences (B = -
.25, p ≤ .05). 
Attitudes about prisons had the strongest influence on support for mandatory 
sentences among Oregon residents in the first model.   Other things being equal, belief 
that prisons protect the public increased the odds of favoring mandatory sentences by 
152%.  Controlling for other influences, belief that prisons should be used for 
punishment increased the odds of supporting mandatory sentencing by 13% (B = .79, p 
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≤ .05).  Finally, belief that crime rose in the previous year increased the odds of 
supporting mandatory sentences by 34% (B=.30, p ≤ .05). 
The second model testing the effect of political experiences was less successful 
in accounting for sentencing preferences, although the overall model was statistically 
significant (χ2 = 77.2, p ≤ .05).  Only self-reported political ideology and perceived risk 
of crime predicted support for mandatory sentences.  A unit increase in conservatism 
was associated with a 26% increase in the odds of support for mandatory sentences (B = 
.23, p ≤ .05).  An increase in perceived risk of crime increased the odds of supporting 
mandatory sentences by 34%.  Political trust, political efficacy, and political 
participation were unrelated to support for mandatory sentencing after other variables in 
the model were controlled.   
In the full model, attitudes about the efficacy of prosecutors, judges, prisons, and 
conservatism remained robust determinants of sentencing preferences. Perceived risk of 
crime, however, was no longer statistically significant.  The strength of the relationship 
between beliefs about prisons and mandatory sentences changed somewhat once 
conservatism was included in the analysis.  In the full model, the effect of “prisons 
should punish” became somewhat stronger whereas the effect of “prisons protect” 
became somewhat weaker.  Still, belief that the main purpose of prisons is protection 
had the largest effect on the odds of supporting mandatory sentencing in the full model.   
Discussion 
If criminal justice policies are a function of political decision making, it appears that 
Oregonians support mandatory sentencing primarily because they believe it is good 
policy.  Those who endorse mandatory sentences are more likely to have confidence in 
the efficacy of prosecutors, but not judges, and to believe that prisons protect the public.  
This interpretation is well captured in a 2013 Willamette Week headline that proclaimed 
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“The Hard Truth About Oregon Prisons: They Work.”  This feature story ran on the 
paper’s front page and rejected the recommendations of the bipartisan Governor’s 
Commission on Public Safety that proposed policies to reduce the use of incarceration 
(Jaquiss, 2013).  The article focused on Oregon’s low recidivism rate, the role that 
prisons play in removing violent offenders from society, and prosecutors’ strong 
advocacy in maintaining public safety. 
The politics of punishment in Oregon illustrate the limits of reform efforts that 
seek to reduce reliance on incarceration.  Rather than leading on criminal justice reform 
as might be expected from a state that enjoys low rates of crime (FBI 2015), high levels 
of civic engagement, and a progressive reputation (Gray and Hanson, 2004), efforts to 
change sentencing in the state have largely failed and the Oregon prison population 
continues to increase (Carson and Anderson, 2016).   The results obtained here indicate 
that the tenacity of “tough” policies may be explained in part by confidence in local 
decision makers and beliefs about prisons rather than broad feelings of trust in 
government and political efficacy. 2 
This raises an interesting question about the role that knowledge plays in 
shaping public opinion about policy.  Specifically, how knowledgeable is the public 
about mandatory sentences or the efficacy of prisons, prosecutors, and judges?  One 
way to gauge knowledge is to consider voter turnout and “drop-off,” which occurs when 
voters fill out the “top” of a ballot but do not vote for “down” ballot candidates like 
judges and district attorneys.  Voter engagement in campaigns for judges and 
prosecutors tends to be low in part because these are often uncontested races.  A report 
by the ACLU of Oregon (2016) found that when elections were competitive in district 
attorney races, voter drop-off declined from 40% in uncontested races to 12% in 
contested races.  Voter knowledge of mandatory sentencing is probably high in Oregon, 
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whose citizens have directly voted for numerous measures that expand or attempt to 
repeal such laws.  For example, 85% of registered Oregonians voted on Measures 57 
and 61 in 2008 (Ballotpedia, nd) and millions of dollars have been spent on signature 
drives and political campaigns for various mandatory sentencing ballot measures.  
Nevertheless, it is safe to say that knowledge of judges and prosecutors (and criminal 
justice policy more generally) is probably low.  The lack of accurate knowledge among 
the public about crime and criminal justice is well established (Cullen et al., 2000). 
If we assume that citizens’ knowledge of these issues is low—or worse, 
misinformed—it remains unclear what effect accurate knowledge may have on attitudes 
about crime policy.  The NCSC sentencing attitudes survey (Princeton Survey Research 
Associates, 2006) found, for example, that awareness of mandatory sentencing laws had 
little influence on attitudes about the use of mandatory sentences in general or for 
specific types of crime.   This finding is consistent with experimental research that finds 
that people are willing to update their factual beliefs (e.g., that crime did not increase in 
2016) but that they interpret facts in a way that remains consistent with their belief 
systems (Nyhan, Porter, Reifler, and Wood, 2017). 
To complicate matters, while we found that utilitarian beliefs about the efficacy 
of criminal justice institutions were important influences on support for mandatory 
sentencing, concerns about crime were not.  Specifically, we found limited support for 
the idea that perceived risk of crime increases demand for punishment and no support 
for the idea that fear of crime or victimization were associated with a preference for 
mandatory sentences.  After other theoretically important concepts were included in the 
analysis, those who were fearful, believed that crime was rising, or were victims of 
crime were no more or less likely to support mandatory sentences than participants who 
were less concerned about and directly affected by crime.   
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The disconnection between utilitarian beliefs and concerns about crime appear 
to be related to political ideology.  The results indicate that perceptions about the risk of 
crime mediate the relationship between political beliefs and attitudes about the purpose 
of prisons.  Political beliefs also appear to have a direct and indirect effect on support 
for punishment through relationships to perceived risk and beliefs about prison.  Thus, 
conservatives were (1) more likely to believe that crime is increasing compared to more 
moderate or liberal respondents, (2) more likely to believe that prisons should protect 
the public and punish, and (3) more likely to endorse mandatory punishment. 
The finding that victimization had no effect on support for mandatory sentences 
is also noteworthy given the centrality of victim’s rights to the politics of mandatory 
sentencing. The success of several ballot initiatives in Oregon expanding the use of 
mandatory sentencing may be attributed to the effectiveness of Crime Victims United, 
an influential interest group that has effectively campaigned to pass citizen initiatives 
increasing sentence lengths and protecting mandatory sentences from repeal or 
modification (Merritt et al., 2006).  Thus, the “valorization of victimization” (Simon, 
2007), beliefs about victims (Pickett et al., 2013), and attitudes about the government’s 
responsibility to victims may be more important to study than actual victimization.  
 Finally, although race was treated as a control variable in the current study, it is 
notable that African Americans were less likely to support mandatory sentences than 
individuals of other racial and ethnic backgrounds.  Specifically, the odds of supporting 
mandatory sentences, controlling for other influences, was close to 60% lower among 
African Americans.  This finding reminds us of the centrality of the White racial frame 
in understanding support for policies like mandatory sentences that contribute to 
systemic racism (Feagin, 2013).   
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The idea that factual information—such as the efficacy of criminal justice 
institutions and experiences of crime—may be interpreted through ideological and 
racial frames blurs the distinction between instrumental and expressive motives of 
punishment.  As noted above, utilitarian and retributive goals can be pursued 
simultaneously (Hudson, 2001) and utilitarianism may be affectively satisfying 
(Carvalho and Chamberlen, 2017).  In this study, we see evidence of both instrumental 
and expressive judgements about punishment influencing a preference for mandatory 
sentencing.  The cross-sectional nature of the data and the limits of our measures 
prevent us from exploring whether the “emotional dog is wagging its rational tail,” but a 
growing body of research from cognitive psychology provides strong evidence that 
moral reasoning is a post hoc explanation employed to persuade others about the 
correctness of intuitive moral judgements (Haidt, 2012).  Thus, instrumental claims to 
crime control and expressive appeals to desert, harm, or fairness may be the result, not 
the cause, of intuitive judgements about punishment policy. 
Limitations 
Among the limitations of the current study is the lack of a measure capturing racial 
attitudes. Research has found that racial animus helps explain greater punitiveness 
among Whites (Frost, 2010; Hurwitz and Peffley, 2005; Pickett et al., 2014; Unnever 
and Cullen, 2010). Pickett et al. (2014) indicate racial animus operated as a mediator in 
the relationship between Tea Party Movement membership and support for punitive 
policies, indicating a connection between political affiliations, racial animus, and 
sentencing attitudes. Taking a somewhat different approach, Barker (2009) stresses how 
racial politics shape whether policies are punitive, and this impact varies by political 
context (also see Pfaff, 2017).   
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To evaluate the robustness of the findings, we conducted a post-hoc analysis of 
the full model among the sample of racial and ethnic minorities (n=246).   The results 
were mostly unchanged.  Minorities who thought prosecutors were doing a good job, 
that prisons protect, and that prisons punish were more likely to support mandatory 
sentences.  Confidence in judges was no longer statistically significant (p=.14), but the 
direction of the relationship and the effect size remained the same suggesting that 
differences in sample size account for the different results.  Finally, political beliefs 
were unrelated to support for mandatory sentences among racial and ethnic minorities.  
This exploratory analysis adds confidence to the generalizability of the findings, but 
also point to the complex role that race, politics, and racial beliefs may play in 
explaining punitive beliefs.   
As noted above, the measure of political participation used in the current study 
was limited to a single item question about voting behavior.  More research is needed to 
better understand how various types of political participation and civic engagement 
affect tolerance, punitiveness, and confidence in criminal justice institutions. Although 
we did not find an association between punitiveness and political efficacy or political 
participation, scholars may benefit from exploring these concepts further.  Lukensmeyer 
and Torres (2006) observe, for example, “Government officials often endorse public 
engagement because they believe it fosters active citizenship and has positive benefits 
to the substance, transparency, legitimacy, and fairness of policy development as well 
as a general view of government held by citizens” (p. 5).  Trust in government, 
tolerance, and empathy for others that often result from public engagement (Nabatchi 
and Amsler, 2014) may shape participants’ attitudes on public policy in this area.  More 
empirical work is needed to test the paths between these concepts and more fully 
develop the measurement theory of public engagement. 
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 The ability to generalize from the results to other states is also unknown, 
particularly given the high level of direct voter engagement in the state surrounding 
mandatory sentencing.  Scholars have also argued for the importance of state-level 
analysis of political structures and cultures in shaping punitive policy choices (Baker, 
2006; Tonry, 2004), which argues against generalizing specific attitudes to other states.  
Nevertheless, this study adds to the evidence that punitive policy is shaped in part by 
instrumental concerns about crime and confidence in government institutions. 
Can the polls be trusted? 
In 2016, opinion polls failed spectacularly to predict the “Brexit” vote in the United 
Kingdom or the outcome of the United States presidential election, in which Donald 
Trump defeated Hillary Clinton, who was predicted to win by comfortable margins.  
Recent election results were a sober reminder of the limitations of even the best polling 
methods and should prompt caution about drawing behavioral inferences from surveys 
of attitudes, intentions, and opinions.  Although public attitudes are worthy of study and 
theorizing independent of their direct relationship to policymaking, most criminal 
justice scholars are also interested in the relationship between public attitudes and 
public policy.   
Shortly after the data used in this research were collected in the summer of 
2010, Oregon voters passed Measure 73, enacting a 90-day mandatory minimum 
sentence for a third drunk driving conviction and raising the minimum sentence for 
those convicted of more than one serious sexual offense to 25 years (Oregon Secretary 
of State, 2016).  Measure 73 was sponsored by Crime Victims United, which appealed 
to voters’ animosity toward sex offenders and sensitivity to local taxes (the measure 
also required the state to foot the bill for incarcerating DUI offenders) to generate 
support for the measure.  The measure passed with 57% of the vote (Oregon Secretary 
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of State, 2016), which is 20 percentage points higher than the level of support for 
mandatory sentences found in this study.  
The divergence we observe between voting behaviour and survey data is not a 
surprise to careful readers of the research.  For example, Cullen et al. (2000) argue that 
attitudes about punishment are “mushy,” not firm.  Changes in contextual information, 
references to offender type, question wording, and even response choice order (Pickett 
and Baker, 2014) can result in substantial variation in levels of support for criminal 
justice policies.  Consistent with assertions from the research literature, the passage of 
Measure 73 shows the complexity of public opinion on sentencing policy and 
continuing popular appeal of long prison sentences in the US.  Along with the findings 
presented here, research demonstrates that the discipline would benefit from additional 
empirical knowledge that more directly studies how public interests, beliefs, and 
experiences contribute to criminal justice policy making.  Even in a national context of 
declining punitiveness, mandatory sentences continue to appeal to residents in a 
progressive state as an effective means for protecting the public and punishing 
offenders.  
The intuition that prisons and prosecutors keep people safe, but judges protect 
the rights of the accused, are powerful influences on judgements about how society 
should respond to the threat of crime.  If judgements about punishment policy are 
indeed intuitive, does this mean that reasoned arguments and evidence about the 
efficacy and fairness of policies similar to mandatory sentences are bound to fall short?  
According to the social intuitionist model, moral persuasion is possible when we can get 
others to see issues in new ways that trigger different senses about what is right and 
wrong (Haidt, 2012).   Reformers might need a more powerful metaphor to convey the 
value of alternatives to long, mandatory sentences and a more compelling story about 
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the harms of prison to realize significant changes in punishment policy and establish a 
new common sense about how to safeguard our communities. 
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Footnotes 
1 At the time that the survey was in the field, the political campaign for and against 
ballot Measure 73, which is increased mandatory minimums for sex offenders and 
drunk drivers, was active. 
2 The finding that global and specific attitudes about government exert different 
influences on attitudes about sentencing is an interesting parallel to the well-established 
finding that global and specific attitudes about punishment are distinct, but related, 
dimensions of belief (Cullen et al., 2000).   
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Table 1. Level of Support for Mandatory Sentencing and Confidence in Judges and Prosecutors. 
In general, do you think mandatory sentences are a good idea, or do you think that judges 
should have more say in deciding sentences? 
Judges should have more say 63.5% 
Mandatory sentences are good idea 36.5% 
I’d like your opinion on how well different groups in Oregon are doing addressing crime and 
public safety. 
 Judges Prosecutors and District Attorneys 
Excellent job 4.7% 4.0% 
Good job 45.8% 45.7% 
Fair job 37.0% 39.1% 
Poor job 12.5% 11.2% 
Note: margin of error ± 2.47 percentage points 
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Table 2.  Sources of Support for Mandatory Sentences (n=1,142) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Full Model 
 B SE B eB B SE B eB B SE B eB 
Prosecutor Efficacy .32* .11 1.37    .32* .12 1.37 
Judicial Efficacy -.25* .11 .777    -.25* .12 .78 
Prison Protects .93* .15 2.52    .78* .16 2.18 
Prison Punishes .79* .11 1.13    .61* .29 1.84 
Political Trust     -.01 .03 .984 .02 .04 1.02 
Political Efficacy    .01 .14 1.01 -.02 .16 .981 
Conservative    .23* .05 1.26 .21* .05 1.23 
Political Participation    .10 .25 1.09 .02 .27 1.02 
Fear of Crime .13 .11 1.13 .18 .10 1.20 .12 .11 1.13 
Victimization .09 .08 1.09 .06 .08 1.06 .10 .09 1.10 
Perceived Risk  .30* .15 1.34 .29* .15 1.34 .22 .16 1.25 
African American -.68* .25 .509 -1.0* .24 .355 -.90* .28 .409 
Age .01 .01 1.00 .01 .005 1.00 .01 .01 1.00 
Female -.29 .15 .747 -.25 .145 .777 -.34 .16 .714 
Income .10* .04 1.11 .10* .040 1.10 .09* .04 1.09 
χ2 93.91* 77.72* 106.81* 
df 11 11 15 
 
 
